From Data to Disinformation
Radicalization risks associated with election data access
Special Note: the data for our midterm elections disinformation dashboard has just been updated. If you want access to the dashboard, request access here.
One of the controversial trends in the 2022 midterms is the influx of election deniers into the election process itself. For example, deniers are working as poll workers, election observers, and requesting election materials for their own auditing. Optimistically, this engagement with the voting process can lead to a better understanding of how elections actually work, dispelling the misinformation on which the election skepticism is based. Pessimistically, this engagement can act as a smoke machine providing fodder for election deniers to manufacture new disinformation.
From the dashboard, we see an example of this from New Mexico where an election denial activist reported that, after pouring over voting machine certificates, many lacked the clerk’s seal and was signed by more people than the clerk (according to NM law, deputy clerks are allowed to sign certificates). The activist referred the elections officials to her sheriff and filed complaints with elections officials.
Participatory Disinformation
Disinformation doesn’t just come from elites, governments, and other well-funded actors. Prior to the 2020 election, Kate Starbird and colleagues, argued that disinformation spread online through a combination of actors including foreign information operators, conspiracy-minded communities, and fake news outlets.
During the 2020 election, we saw a new pattern of participatory disinformation emerge. Small accounts would post primary source material, typically photos or videos, and falsely claiming to have witnessed some misdeed. The crowd would circulate the claims until they hit major hubs of disinformation spread who would then supercharge the spread. Perhaps the most well-known example of this is the video purported to show election workers pulling ballots from briefcases. (See Starbird’s Twitter thread from 2020 for an excellent account)
The challenge with participatory disinformation is that it can come from anywhere. In our last post, we found a homemade disinformation TikTok purporting to show unidentified people collecting ballots at drop boxes (these people turned out to be poll workers and the TikTok account is linked to a right-wing Twitter account from Oregon). In this case, the state of Washington had been using election workers to collect ballots at drop boxes to prevent long voting lines. Only now did an election denying activist try to misrepresent the process.
How does it work?
What makes participatory disinformation difficult to deal with is that it often reaches amplifiers independent of fact checking or verification. For example, a person posts an image of a suspicious person online and claims they did something illegal without reporting it to elections officials or waiting for a response from the authorities. Before authorities have a chance to weigh in, the eye-witness account gets picked up by disinformation amplifiers until it reaches a super-spreader like a disinformation news source or super-spreader accounts.
Elections officials may not even know the disinformation has been widely shared and so may not know to issue a public correction. The first sign of a disinformation problem may be harassment or death threats from activists.
What do you do about it
The solution is not limiting access. That is undemocratic and certainly counterproductive. Instead, the strategy must be reducing the likelihood and potential impact of this risk.
Reducing the likelihood of participatory disinformation
Develop processes for quickly responding to complaints. The goal is to reduce the chance someone posts misleading content by providing them with good information as quickly as possible. Even if someone identifies criminal activity that is not misinformation, a quick response that the allegation is taken seriously can forestall a post claiming illegal activity is being permitted.
Train observers to report irregularities and encourage them to hold off on posting anything on social media until they hear from an official. This is already part of worker and observer training, but it more important now that there are many people primed and ready to amplify even well-intended posts. Teach observers the correct reporting channels and explain how social media posts can improperly undermine faith in elections.
Monitor social media for early warnings of disinformation about your election. Participatory disinformation often takes a while to work and often works off of established tropes (e.g. “ballot harvesting” “ballot stuffing”). By monitoring social media for these tropes in the context of your local area, you can get an early warning into disinformation before it gets picked up and take appropriate action.
Reducing the Impact of Disinformation
Prebunk. Prebunking is a proven way to reduce the likelihood people engage with disinformation. Along with digital literacy, it’s one of the few things you can do ahead of time to stymy disinformation. In this case, elections officials and security professionals should be warning people to be warry of social media posts claiming election fraud. These videos could be fake or improperly contextualized so should be treated with skepticism. It’s also possible that they are entirely true. In either case, it should be left to elections officials to adjudicate these issues.
Have a Correction and Information Strategy. Once disinformation is in circulation, the best medicine is putting good information in circulation. This present two challenges - how do you put out good information and how do you circulate it. This varies place to place, depending on where disinformation is spreading locally and what resources the office, clerk, or agency has for communications. But there actually is a 19-page, research-based Debunking Handbook you can use to formulate your strategy.
Work with Allies to spread the word. People listen to those they trust. Sometimes it is people like them. Sometimes it’s experts. Sometimes it’s community leaders. When trying to address disinformation circulating about your election, working with diverse allies will help you reach diverse audiences. Have republican officials talk to their local party. Have church leaders talk to their congregations. Have Facebook moderators explain the situation to their groups.
Elections are the best opportunity we have to build trust in our democratic processes. It is essential that those who have doubts about it are able to have their concerns addressed without further eroding trust by participating in disinformation. It’s a precarious balance but one we must execute to preserve and renew our democracy.
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